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sible resources/goods. The preferences of each player for different bundles of the items
are expressed via a valuation set function (one per player). The main challenge is to
design a (truthful) mechanism that allocates the items in an efficient way in the equi-
librium, i.e., so that it maximizes the social welfare, which is the sum of the valuations
of the players for the received bundles. Although it is well-known that this can be
achieved optimally by the VCG mechanism [Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973],
unfortunately this might take exponential time in m and n [Nisan and Ronen 1999,
2000] (unless P=NP).
In practice, several simple non-truthful mechanisms are used. The most notable ex-
amples are generalized second price (GSP) auctions used by AdWords [Edelman et al.
2007; Varian 2007], simultaneous ascending price auctions for wireless spectrum allo-
cation [Milgrom 2000], or independent second price auctions on eBay. Furthermore, in
these auctions the expressive power of the buyers is heavily restricted by the bidding
language, so that they are not able to represent their complex preferences precisely.
In light of the above, Christodoulou et al. [2008] proposed the study of simple, non-
truthful auctions using the price of anarchy (PoA) [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
1999] as a measure of inefficiency of such auctions.3
Item bidding. Of particular interest are the so-called combinatorial auctions with
item-bidding, from both practical and theoretical aspects. In such an auction, the auc-
tioneer sells each item by running simultaneously m independent single-item auctions.
Depending on the type of single-item auctions used, the two main variants that have
been studied are simultaneous second-price auctions (SPAs) [Christodoulou et al. 2008;
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Feldman et al. 2013] and simultaneous first-price
auctions (FPAs) [Hassidim et al. 2011; Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013; Feldman et al.
2013]. In both cases, the bidders are asked to submit a bid for each item. Then each
item is assigned to the highest bidder. The main difference is that in the former a win-
ner is charged an amount equal to the second highest bid while in the latter a winner
pays his own bid.
FPAs have been shown to be more efficient than SPAs. For general valuations, Has-
sidim et al. [2011] showed that pure equilibria of FPAs are efficient whenever they
exist, but mixed, and Bayesian Nash equilibria of FPAs can be highly inefficient in
settings with complementarities. For two important classes of valuation functions,
namely fractionally subadditive and subadditive4, for mixed and Bayesian Nash equi-
libria, [Hassidim et al. 2011; Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] and [Feldman et al. 2013]
showed that FPAs have lower (constant) price of anarchy than the respective bounds
obtained for SPAs [Christodoulou et al. 2008; Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Feld-
man et al. 2013]. The current best upper bounds for the price of anarchy in FPA are
e/(e− 1) for XOS valuations [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013], and 2 for subadditive valu-
ations [Feldman et al. 2013] (proven by different techniques).
Our Contribution. Following the work of [Hassidim et al. 2011; Feldman et al. 2013;
Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013], we study the price of anarchy of FPAs for games with
complete and incomplete information. Our main concern is the development of tools
that provide tight bounds for the price of anarchy of these auctions. Our results com-
plement the current knowledge about simultaneous first-price auctions. We provide
matching lower bounds to the upper bounds by Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] and Feld-
man et al. [2013], showing that even for the case of full information and mixed Nash
3In this setting, the price of anarchy is defined as the worst-case ratio of the optimal social welfare over the
social welfare obtained in a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.
4Fractionally subadditive valuations are also known as XOS valuations. For definitions of these valuation
functions we refer the reader to Section 2.
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equilibria the PoA is at least e/(e − 1) for submodular5 valuations (and therefore for
XOS) and 2 for subadditive valuations6.
We present an alternative proof of the upper bound of e/(e − 1) for FPAs with frac-
tionally subadditive valuations. This bound was shown before in [Syrgkanis and Tar-
dos 2013] using a general smoothness framework. Our approach does not adhere to
their framework. A nice thing with our approach, is that it reveals the worst-case
price distribution, that we then use as a building block for the matching lower bound
construction. An immediate consequence of our results is that the price of anarchy of
these auctions stays the same, for mixed, correlated, coarse-correlated, and Bayesian
Nash equilibria. Only for pure Nash equilibria it is equal to 1. Our findings suggest
that smoothness may provide tight results for certain classes of auctions, using as a
base class the class of mixed Nash equilibria, and not that of pure equilibria. This is in
contrast to what is known for routing games, where the respective base class was the
class of pure equilibria.
For buyers with additive valuations (or for the single item auction), we show that
any mixed Nash equilibrium is efficient in contrast to Bayesian Nash equilibria that
were previously known not to be always efficient [Krishna 2002]. This suggests an in-
teresting separation between the full and the incomplete information cases as opposed
to other valuation functions (for example submodular and subadditive) and other auc-
tion formats such as all-pay auctions due to Baye et al. [1996].
Then we generalize our results to a class of item bidding auctions that we call bid-
dependent auctions. Intuitively, a single item auction is bid-dependent if the winner is
always the highest bidder, and a bidder’s payment depends only on his own bid. Note
that both winner and losers may have to pay. Apart from the FPA (where the losers
pay 0), another notable item-bidding auction that falls into this class is the simultane-
ous all-pay (first-price) auction (APA) [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013], where all bidders
(even the losers) are charged their bids. For subadditive valuations, we show that the
PoA of simultaneous bid-dependent auctions is exactly 2, by showing tight upper and
lower bounds. We show that the upper bound technique due to Feldman et al. [2013]
for FPAs, can be applied to all mechanisms of this class. Interestingly, although one
might expect that FPAs perform strictly better than APAs, our results suggest that
all simultaneous bid-dependent auctions perform equally well. We note that our upper
bound for subadditive valuations extends the previously known upper bound of 2 for
APAs that was only known for XOS valuations [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] .
Finally, we apply our techniques on discriminatory price multi-unit auctions [Kr-
ishna 2002]. We complement the results by de Keijzer et al. [2013] for the case of sub-
additive valuations, by providing a matching lower bound of 2, for the standard bidding
format. For the case of submodular valuations, we were able to provide a lower bound
of 1.109. We were also able to reproduce their upper bound of e/(e − 1) for submodu-
lar bids, using our non-smooth approach. Note that the previous lower bound for such
auctions was 1.0004 [de Keijzer et al. 2013] for Bayesian Nash equilibria. Both of our
lower bounds hold for the case of mixed Nash equilibria.
Related Work. A long line of research aims to design simple auctions with good per-
formance guarantee (see e.g. [Hartline and Roughgarden 2009; Chawla et al. 2010]).
The (in)efficiency of first-price price auctions has been observed in economics (cf. [Kr-
5In fact our lower bound holds even for the class of OXS valuations that is a strict subclass of submodular
valuations. We refer the reader to Section 2 for a definition of OXS valuations and for their relation to other
valuation classes.
6Independently, and after a preliminary version of our work [Christodoulou et al. 2013], Roughgarden [2014]
showed a general method to provide lower bounds for the Price of Anarchy of auctions. We discuss it and
compare it to our work in the Related Work paragraph.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: October 2015.
X:4 George Christodoulou et al.
Table I. Summary of the bounds on the PoA of FPAs.
Valuations Lower Bound Upper Bound
General, Pure 1 1 [Bikhchandani 1999]
[Hassidim et al. 2011]
General, M-B
√
m [Hassidim et al. 2011] m [Hassidim et al. 2011]
SA, M-B 2 [This paper] 2 [Feldman et al. 2013]
XOS, M-B e/(e− 1) [This paper] e/(e− 1) [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013]
SM, M-B e/(e− 1) [This paper] e/(e− 1) [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013]
OXS, M-B e/(e− 1) [This paper] e/(e− 1) [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013]
Table II. In the first column, the first argument refers to the valuation class and the second argument to the
related equilibrium concept. SA and SM stand for subadditive and submodular valuations, respectively,
and where ‘M-B’ appears the bounds hold for mixed, correlated, coarse correlated or Bayesian Nash
equilibria.
ishna 2002]) starting from the seminal work by Vickrey [1961]. Bikhchandani [1999]
was the first who studied the simultaneous sealed bid auctions in full information set-
tings and observed the inefficiency of their equilibria.
Christodoulou et al. [2008] extended the concept of PoA to the Bayesian setting and
applied it to item-bidding auctions. Bikhchandani [1999] and then Hassidim et al.
[2011] showed that in case of general valuations, in FPAs pure Nash equilibria are
always efficient (whenever they exist), whereas for SPAs Fu et al. [2012] proved that
the PoA is at most 2. For Bayesian Nash equilibria, Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] and
Feldman et al. [2013] showed improved upper bounds on the Bayesian price of anarchy
(BPoA) for FPAs. Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] came up with a general composability
framework of smooth mechanisms, that proved to be quite useful, as it led to upper
bounds for several settings, such as first price auctions, all-pay auctions and multi-
unit auctions.
Only a few lower-bound results are known for the PoA of simultaneous auctions.
For valuations that include complementarities, Hassidim et al. [2011] presented an
example with PoA = Ω(
√
m) for FPA; as suggested in [Feldman et al. 2013], similar
lower bound can be derived for SPAs, as well. Under the non-overbidding assumption,
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2011] gave a lower bound of 2.013 for SPAs with sub-
additive bidders and Ω(n1/4) for correlated bidders. In [Feldman et al. 2013], similar
results are shown under the weak non-overbidding assumption. We summarize the
PoA results for FPAs in table I.
Very recently and independently, Roughgarden [2014] presented a very elegant
methodology to provide PoA lower bounds via a reduction from communication or
computational complexity lower bounds for the underlying optimization problem. One
consequence of his reduction is a general lower bound of 2 and e/(e − 1) for the PoA
of any simple auction (including item-bidding auctions) with subadditive and fraction-
ally subadditive bidders, respectively. Therefore, there is an overlap with our results
for these two classes of valuations. We show these lower bounds via an explicit con-
struction for FPAs (and also for bid-dependent auctions).
We emphasize that these two approaches are incomparable in the following sense.
On the one hand, the results in [Roughgarden 2014] hold for more general formats of
combinatorial auctions than the ones we study here. On the other hand, our e/(e − 1)
lower bound holds even for more special valuation functions where [Roughgarden
2014]’s results are either weaker (2e/(2e− 1) for submodular valuations) or not appli-
cable. For the case of submodular valuations, Feige and Vondra´k [2010] showed that
a strictly higher than 1 − 1/e amount of the optimum social welfare can be obtained
in polynomial communication and for gross substitute valuations (and therefore for its
subclass, OXS valuations), Nisan and Segal [2006] showed that exact efficiency can
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be obtained in polynomial communication. These two results show that [Roughgarden
2014]’s technique does not provide tight lower bounds for the settings studied in this
paper. We also note that the PoA lower bound obtained by [Roughgarden 2014]’s re-
duction can only be applied to approximate Nash equilibria while our results apply to
exact Nash equilibria. Further, our PoA lower bound proof for subadditive valuations
uses a simpler construction than the proof in [Roughgarden 2014] and it holds even
for the case of only 2 bidders and identical items (multi-unit auction). Finally, it should
be stressed that none of our lower bounds for multi-unit auctions can be derived from
[Roughgarden 2014].
Markakis and Telelis [2012] studied uniform price multi-unit auctions. de Keijzer
et al. [2013] bounded the BPoA for several formats of multi-unit auctions with first or
second price rules. Auctions employing greedy algorithms were studied by Lucier and
Borodin [2010]. A number of works [Paes Leme and Tardos 2010; Caragiannis et al.
2011; Roughgarden 2012] studied the PoA of generalized SPAs in the full information
and Bayesian settings and even with correlated bidders [Lucier and Paes Leme 2011].
Chawla and Hartline [2013] proved that for the generalized FPAs with symmetric
bidders, the pure Bayesian Nash equilibria are unique and always efficient.
Organization of the paper. We introduce the necessary background and notation in
Section 2. Then, we present the tight bounds for FPAs with fractionally subadditive,
subadditive and additive valuations in Sections 3, 4 and 5, respectively. In Section
6, we show how our results can be generalized to a class of auctions that we call bid-
dependent. Finally, we apply our techniques to get bounds on the PoA of discriminatory
multi-unit auctions in Section 7.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Simultaneous first-price auctions constitute a simple type of combinatorial auctions.
In a combinatorial auction with n players (or bidders) and m items, every player i ∈ [n]
has a valuation for each subset of items, given by a valuation function vi : 2[m] → R≥0,
where vi ∈ Vi for some possible set of valuations Vi. A valuation profile for all players
is v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ ×iVi. The vi functions are monotone and normalized, that is,
S ⊆ T ⇒ vi(S) ≤ vi(T ), and vi(∅) = 0. We use the short notation vi(j) = vi({j}).
In the Bayesian setting, the valuation of each player i is drawn from Vi according
to some known distribution Di. We assume that the Di are independent (and possibly
different) over the players. In the full information setting the valuation vi is fixed and
known by all other players for all i ∈ [n]. Note that the latter is a special Bayesian
combinatorial auction, in which player i has valuation vi with probability 1.
An allocation X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is a partition of the items (allowing empty sets
Xi), so that each item is assigned to exactly one player. The most common global
objective in combinatorial auctions is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the
players for their received sets of items, i.e., to maximize the social welfare SW (X)
of the allocation, where SW (X) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(Xi). Therefore, for an optimal allocation
O(v) = O = (O1, . . . , On) the value SW (O) is maximum among all possible allocations.
In a simultaneous (or item bidding) auction every player i ∈ [n] submits a non-
negative bid bij for each item j ∈ [m]. The items are then allocated by independent
auctions: for each j ∈ [m], the bidder i with the highest bid bij receives the item. We
consider the case when the payment for each item is the first price payment: a player
pays his own bid (the highest bid) for every item he receives. Our (upper bound) results
hold for arbitrary randomized tie-breaking rules. Note that with such a rule, for any
fixed b = (b1, . . . , bn), the probabilities for the players to get a particular item are fixed.
For a given bid vector bi, item j ∈ [m] and a subset of items S ⊆ [m] we use the
notation bi(S) =
∑
j∈S bij , and bi(j) = bij . Assume that the players submitted bids for
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the items according to bi = (bi1, . . . , bim) and the simultaneous first-price auction yields
the allocation X(b). For simplicity, we use vi(b) and SW (b) instead of vi(Xi(b)) and
SW (X(b)), to express the valuation of player i and the social welfare for the allocation
X(b) if X is clear from the context. The utility ui of player i is defined as his valuation
for the received set, minus his payments: ui(b) = vi(Xi(b))− bi(Xi(b)).
2.1. Bidding strategies, Nash equilibria, and the price of anarchy
A pure (bidding) strategy bi for player i is a vector of bids for the m items bi =
(bi1, . . . , bim). As usual, b−i denotes the strategies of all players except for i. The pure
strategy profile of all bidders is then b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn).
A mixed strategy Bi of player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies. Let
B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be a profile of mixed strategies. Given a profile B, we fix the notation
for the following cumulative distribution functions (CDF): unless defined otherwise,
Gij is the CDF of the bid of player i for item j; Fj is the CDF of the highest bid for item
j in b, and Fij is the CDF of the highest bid for item j in b−i. Observe that Fj = ΠkGkj ,
and Fij = Πk 6=iGkj . We also use ϕij(x) to denote the probability that player i gets item
j by bidding x. Then ϕij(x) ≤ Fij(x) due to a possible tie in x.
We review five standard equilibrium concepts studied in this paper: pure, mixed,
correlated, coarse correlated and Bayesian Nash equilibria. The first four of them are
for the full information setting and the last one is defined in the Bayesian setting. Let
v = (v1, . . . , vn) be the players valuation functions. In the Bayesian setting, vi is drawn
from Vi according to some known distribution. LetB denote a distribution over bidding
profiles b of the players. Then, B is called a
– pure Nash equilibrium, if B is a pure strategy profile b and ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i).
– mixed Nash equilibrium, if B = ×iBi and Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)].
– correlated Nash equilibrium, if Eb∼B[ui(b)|bi] ≥ Eb∼B[ui(b′i,b−i)|bi].
– coarse correlated Nash equilibrium, if Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb∼B[ui(b′i,b−i)].
– Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if Bi(v) = ×iBi(vi) and Ev−i,b∼B(v)[ui(b)] ≥
Ev−i,b−i∼B−i(v−i)[ui(b′i,b−i)].
where the given inequalities hold for all players i and (pure) deviating bids b′i. It is well
known that each one of the first four classes is contained in the next class, i.e., pure ⊆
mixed ⊆ correlated ⊆ coarse correlated. If we regard the full information setting as a
special case of the Bayesian setting, we also have pure ⊆ mixed ⊆ Bayesian.
For a given auction and fixed valuations v of the bidders, let O be an optimal
allocation. Then for this auction (game) the price of anarchy in pure equilibria is
PoA = maxb pure Nash
SW (O)
SW (b) ; Given a class of auctions, the price of anarchy (PoA) for
this type of auction is the worst case of the above ratio, over all auctions of the class,
valuation profiles v and bidding profile B. For the other four types of equilibria, the
price of anarchy can be defined analogously.
For the expected utility of a given bidder i we often use the short notation E[ui] (if B
is clear from the context) or ui(B) to denote Eb∼B[ui(b)]. Similarly, for fixed b′i, we use
E[ui(b′i)] = Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)]. We also use Ev instead of Ev∼D .
2.2. Types of valuations
Our results concern different classes of valuation functions, which we define next, in
increasing order of inclusion. Let v : 2[m] → R≥0, be a valuation function. Then v is
called
– additive, if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v(j);
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– multi-unit-demand or OXS, if for some k there exist k unit demand valuations vr,
r ∈ [k] (defined as vr(S) = maxj∈S vr(j)), such that v(S) = maxS=⋃˙r∈[k]Sr
∑
r∈[k] v
r(Sr);
7
– submodular, if v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T );
– fractionally subadditive or XOS, if v is determined by a finite set of additive valua-
tions fγ for γ ∈ Γ, so that v(S) = maxγ∈Γ fγ(S);
– subadditive, if v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T );
where the given equalities and inequalities must hold for arbitrary item sets S, T ⊆
[m]. It is well-known that each one of the above classes is strictly contained in the
next class, e.g., an additive set function is always submodular but not vice versa, a
submodular is always XOS, etc. [Feige 2006]. As an equivalent definition, submodular
valuations are exactly the valuations with decreasing marginal values, meaning that
v({j} ∪ T )− v(T ) ≤ v({j} ∪ S)− v(S) holds for any item j, given that S ⊆ T.
3. SUBMODULAR VALUATIONS
In this section we present a lower bound of ee−1 for the mixed PoA in simultaneous
first price auctions with OXS and therefore, submodular and fractionally subadditive
valuations. This is a matching lower bound to the results by Syrgkanis and Tardos
[2013].
In order to the explain the key properties of the instance proving a tight lower bound,
first we discuss a new approach to obtain the same upper bound for the PoA of a first
price single item auction as in [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013]. While the upper bound
that we derive with the help of this idea, can also be obtained based on the very general
smoothness framework [Roughgarden 2012; Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013; de Keijzer
et al. 2013], the approach we introduce here does not adhere to this framework.8 The
strength of our approach consists in its potential to lead to better (in this case tight)
lower bounds, as we demonstrate subsequently.
3.1. PoA Upper Bound for Single Item Auctions
THEOREM 3.1. The PoA of mixed Nash equilibria in first-price single-item auctions
is at most ee−1 .
PROOF. Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) be the valuations of the players, and suppose that vi =
maxk∈[n] vk. We fix a mixed Nash equilibrium B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn). Let pi denote the
highest bid in b−i, and F (x) = Fi(x) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
pi, that is, F (x) = Pb−i∼B−i [pi ≤ x]. The following lemma prepares the ground for the
selection of an appropriate deviating bid.
LEMMA 3.2. For any pure strategy a of player i, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ F (a)(vi − a).
PROOF. If F is continuous in a, then F (a) = P[pi ≤ a] = P[pi < a], tie-breaking in a
does not matter, and F (a) equals also the probability that bidder i gets the item if he
bids a. Therefore, F (a)(vi − a) = Eb−i∼B−i [ui(a,b−i)] ≤ Eb∼B[ui(b)], since B is a Nash
equilibrium. If F is not continuous in a (P[pi = a] > 0), then, as a CDF, it is at least
right-continuous. By the previous argument E[ui(b)] ≥ F (a + )(vi − a − ) holds for
every x = a+  where F is continuous, and the lemma follows by taking → 0.
Since in a Nash equilibrium the expected utility of every (other) player is non-
negative, by summing over all players, it holds that
∑n
k=1 E[uk(b)] ≥ F (a)(vi − a).
7
⋃˙
stands for disjoint union
8Roughly, because the pure deviating bid a that we identify, depends on the other players’ bids b−i in the
Nash equilibrium.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Figure (a) is a schematic illustration of the expression F (a∗)(v−a∗)+E[p], whereA = F (a∗)(v−a∗).
Figure (b) shows the CDF Fˆ (x),which makes all the inequalities of Lemma 3.3 tight, i.e. for every x ∈
[0,
(
1− 1
e
)
v], F (x)(v − x) = A = v
e
.
On the other hand, for any fixed bidding profile b we have uk(b) = vk(Xk(b)) −
bk(Xk(b)), where bk(Xk(b)) = bk whenever bk is a winning bid, and bk(Xk(b)) = 0
otherwise. Let bmax be the maximum bid in b. By taking expectations with regard to
b ∼ B, and summing over the players, E[∑k uk(b)] = E[∑k(vk(Xk(b))− bk(Xk(b)))] =
E[
∑
k vk(Xk(b)) − bmax] = E[SW (b)] − E[bmax]. By combining this with Lemma 3.2, we
obtain
E[SW (b)] = E
[
n∑
k=1
vk(Xk(b))
]
≥ F (a)(vi − a) + E[bmax] ≥ F (a)(vi − a) + E[pi], (1)
for any (deviating) bid a. (Analogues of this derivation are standard in the simultane-
ous auctions literature.) We choose the bid a∗ that maximizes the right hand side of
(1), i.e. a∗ = arg maxa F (a)(v− a) (see Figure 1 (a) for an illustration). Then, in order to
upper bound the PoA, we look for the maximum value of λ, such that,
F (a∗)(vi − a∗) + E[pi] ≥ λvi. (2)
The following lemma settles the maximum value of such λ as 1 − 1e for mixed equi-
libria.9 This will complete the proof of the theorem, since by (1) and SW (O) = vi we
obtain E[SW (b)] ≥ (1− 1e ) · SW (O).
LEMMA 3.3. For any non-negative random variable p with CDF F, and any fixed
value v, it is true that
F (a∗)(v − a∗) + E[p] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
v.
PROOF. Set A = F (a∗)(v − a∗), for a∗ = arg maxa F (a)(v − a). We use the fact that
the expectation of a non-negative random variable with CDF F can be calculated as
9If B is a pure equilibrium, then it is easy to verify that F is a step function, furthermore a∗ = pi, and
inequality (2) boils down to 1 · (vi − a∗) + a∗ = 1 · vi
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E[x] =
∫∞
0
(1− F (x))dx. Thus,
F (a∗)(v − a∗) + E[p] ≥ A+
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx = A+ (v −A)−
∫ v−A
0
F (x)dx
≥ v −
∫ v−A
0
A
v − xdx = v +A ln
(
A
v
)
≥ v + v
e
ln
(
1
e
)
=
(
1− 1
e
)
v,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that A ln(Av ) is minimized for A =
v
e .
Worst-case price distribution. The CDF F (x) that makes all the inequalities of (the
proof of) Lemma 3.3 tight (see Figure 1(b)), is
Fˆ (x) =
{ v
e(v−x) , for x ≤
(
1− 1e
)
v
1 , for x >
(
1− 1e
)
v
Observe that for x ≤ (1− 1e) v, Fˆ (x)(v − x) = ve and for x > (1− 1e) v, Fˆ (x)(v − x) =
v−x < v−(1− 1e )v = ve . So, the bid that maximizes the quantity Fˆ (a)(v−a) is any value
a ∈ [0, (1− 1e) v]. The given distribution Fˆ for pi makes inequality (2) tight. In order to
construct a (tight) lower bound for the PoA, we also need to tighten the inequalities in
(1). Note that the inequality of Lemma 3.2 is tight for all a ∈ [0, (1− 1e) v]. Intuitively,
we need to construct a Nash equilibrium, where the CDF of pi is equal to Fˆ (x) and bi
doesn’t exceed pi. We present a construction (with many items) in Section 3.2.
Remark 3.4. Here we discuss our technique and the smoothness technique that
achieves the same upper bound [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013]. In [Syrgkanis and Tardos
2013], a particular mixed bidding strategy A0 was defined for each player i, such that
for every price p = maxi′ 6=i bi′ , EA0 [ui(A0, p)] + p ≥ v(1 − 1/e). If we denote g(A,F ) =
EA,F [ui(a, p) + p], it can be deduced that maxA minp g(A, p) ≥ v(1− 1/e). In Lemma 3.3
we show that minF maxa g(a, F ) ≥ v(1− 1/e). Moreover, we prove that the inequality is
tight by providing the minimizing distribution Fˆ , such that maxa g(a, Fˆ ) = v(1 − 1/e).
By the Minimax Theorem, minF maxa g(a, F ) = maxA minp g(A, p) = v(1 − 1/e). One
advantage of our approach is that it can be coupled with a worst-case distribution Fˆ
that serves as an optimality certificate of the method. Moreover, if one can convert
Fˆ to Nash Equilibrium strategy profile (see Section 3.2), a tight Nash equilibrium
construction is obtained; this can be a challenging task, though.
3.2. Tight Lower Bound
Here we present a tight lower bound of ee−1 for the mixed PoA in simultaneous first
price auctions with OXS valuations. This implies a lower bound for submodular and
fractionally subadditive valuations.
THEOREM 3.5. The price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions with full
information and OXS valuations is at least ee−1 ≈ 1.58.
PROOF. We construct an instance with n + 1 players and nn items. We define
the set of items as M = [n]n, that is, they correspond to all the different vectors
w = (w1, w2, ..., wn) with wi ∈ [n] (where [n] denotes the set of integers {1, . . . , n}). Intu-
itively, they can be thought of as the nodes of an n dimensional grid, with coordinates
in [n] in each dimension.
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. The figure illustrates the cases n = 2 and n = 3 ((a) and (b) respectively) for the lower bound
example with submodular valuation functions. In (c) an optimal allocation for the case n = 3 is shown.
We call player 0 the dummy player, and all other players i ∈ [n] real players. We
associate each real player i with one of the dimensions (directions) of the grid. In par-
ticular, for any fixed player i, his valuation for a subset of items S ⊆ M is the size
(number of elements) in the n− 1-dimensional projection of S in direction i. Formally,
vi(S) = |{w−i | ∃wi s.t. (wi, w−i) ∈ S}|.
It is straightforward to check that vi has decreasing marginal values, and is therefore
submodular10. The dummy player 0 has valuation 0 for any subset of items.
Given these valuations, we describe a mixed Nash equilibrium B = (B1, . . . , Bn)
having a PoA arbitrarily close to e/(e− 1), for large enough n. The dummy player bids
0 for every item, and receives the item if all of the real players bid 0 for it. The utility
and welfare of the dummy player is always 0. For real players the mixed strategy Bi
is the following. Every player i picks a number ` ∈ [n] uniformly at random, and an x
according to the distribution with CDF
G(x) = (n− 1)
(
1
(1− x) 1n−1
− 1
)
,
where x ∈
[
0, 1− (n−1n )n−1]. Subsequently, he bids x for every item w = (`, w−i), with
wi = ` as ith coordinate, and bids 0 for the rest of the items, see Figure 2 for the cases
of n = 2 and n = 3. That is, in any bi in the support of Bi, the player bids a positive x
only for an n− 1 dimensional slice of the items. Observe that G(·) has no mass points,
so tie-breaking matters only in case of 0 bids for an item, in which case player 0 gets
the item.
Let F (x) denote the probability that bidder i gets a fixed item j, given that he bids
bi(j) = x for this item, and the bids in b−i are drawn from B−i (due to symmetry,
this probability is the same for all items w = (`, w−i)). For every other player k, the
probability that he bids 0 for item j is (n − 1)/n, and the probability that j is in his
selected slice but he bids lower than x is G(x)/n. Multiplying over the n − 1 other
10These valuations are also OXS. In the definition of OXS valuations (Section 2), we set k = nn−1 and
for the unit-demand valuations corresponding to player i the following holds: if item j corresponds to w =
(w1, w2, ..., wn) then for r ∈ [k], vri (j) = 1, if w−i is the n-ary representation of r and vri (j) = 0, otherwise.
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players, we obtain
F (x) =
(
G(x)
n
+
n− 1
n
)n−1
=
(
n−1
n
)n−1
1− x .
Notice that vi is an additive valuation restricted to the slice of items that player i
bids for in a particular bi. Therefore, when player i bids x in bi, his expected utility is
F (x)(1− x) for one of these items, and comprising all items it is E[ui(bi)] = nn−1F (x) ·
(1− x) = nn−1 (n−1n )n−1 = (n− 1)n−1.
Next we show that B is a Nash equilibrium. In particular, the bids bi in the support
of Bi maximize the expected utility of a fixed player i.
First, we fix an arbitrary w−i, and focus on the set of items C := {(`, w−i) | ` ∈ [n]},
which we call a column for player i. Recall that i is interested in getting only one item
within C, while his valuation is additive over items from different columns. Moreover,
in a fixed b−i, every other player k submits the same bid for all items in C, because
either the whole C is in the current slice of k, and he bids the same value x, or no item
from the column is in the slice and he bids 0. Consider first a deviating bid, in which i
bids a positive value for more than one items in C, say (at least) the values x ≥ x′ > 0
where x is his highest bid in C. Then his expected utility for this column is strictly less
than F (x)(1− x), because his value is F (x) · 1, but he might have to pay x+ x′, in case
he gets both items. Consequently, bidding x for only one item in C and 0 for the rest of
C is more profitable.
Second, observe that restricted to a fixed column, submitting any bid x ∈[
0, 1− (n−1n )n−1] for one arbitrary item results in the constant expected utility of(
n−1
n
)n−1, whereas a bid higher than 1 − (n−1n )n−1 guarantees the item but pays
more so the utility becomes strictly less than
(
n−1
n
)n−1 for this column. In summary,
bidding for exactly one item from each column, an arbitrary (possibly different) bid
x ∈
[
0, 1− (n−1n )n−1] is a best response for i yielding the above expected utility, which
concludes the proof that B is a Nash equilibrium.
It remains to calculate the expected social welfare of B, and the optimal social wel-
fare. We define a random variable w.r.t. the distribution B. Let Zj = 1 if one of the real
players 1, . . . , n gets item j, and Zj = 0 if player 0 gets the item. Note that the social
welfare is the random variable
∑
j∈M Zj , and the expected social welfare is
E
b∼B
[SW (b)] =
∑
j
E[Zj ]·1 = nn(1−Pr(no real player bids for j)) = nn
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)n)
.
Finally, we show that the optimum social welfare is nn. An optimal allocation can be
constructed as follows: For each item (w1, w2, ..., wn) compute r = (
∑n
i=1 wi mod n).
Allocate this item to the player r + 1. It is easy to see that this way the n items of any
particular column {(`, w−k) | ` ∈ [n]} (in any direction k) are given to the n different
players, and that each player is allocated nn−1 items (Figure 2(c) shows the optimum
allocation for n = 3). In other words, any two items allocated to the same player dif-
fer in at least two coordinates. In particular, they belong to different columns of this
player, and all contribute 1 to the valuation of the player, which is therefore nn−1. Since
this valuation is maximum possible for every player, the obtained social welfare of nn
is optimal.
Thus, the Price of Anarchy is 1
(1−(n−1n )
n
)
, and for large n it converges to 1
(1− 1e )
≈
1.58.
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4. SUBADDITIVE VALUATIONS
Here we show a lower bound of 2 on the mixed PoA when players have subadditive
valuations. This lower bound matches the upper bound by Feldman et al. [2013].
THEOREM 4.1. The mixed PoA of simultaneous first price auctions with subadditive
bidder valuations is at least 2.
PROOF. Consider two players and m items with the following valuations: player 1
is a unit-demand player with valuation v < 1 (to be determined later) if she gets at
least one item; player 2 has valuation 1 for getting at least one but less than m items,
and 2 if she gets all the items. Inspired by [Hassidim et al. 2011], we use the following
distribution functions:
G(x) =
(m− 1)x
1− x x ∈ [0, 1/m]; F (y) =
v − 1/m
v − y y ∈ [0, 1/m].
Player 1 picks one of the m items uniformly at random, and bids x for this item and 0
for all other items. Player 2 bids y for each of the m items. The bids x and y are drawn
from distributions with CDF F (x) and G(y), respectively. In the case of a tie, the item
is always allocated to player 2.
Let B denote this mixed bidding profile. We are going to prove that B is a mixed
Nash equilibrium for every v > 1/m.
If player 1 bids any x in the range (0, 1/m] for the one item, she gets the item with
probability F (x), since a tie appears with zero probability. Her expected utility for
x ∈ (0, 1/m] is F (x)(v − x) = v − 1/m. Thus if player 1 picks x randomly according to
G(x), her utility is v−1/m (note that according toG(x) she bids 0 with zero probability).
Bidding something greater than 1/m results in a utility less than v − 1/m. Regarding
player 1, it remains to show that her utility while bidding for only one item is at least
her utility while bidding for more items. Suppose player 1 bids xi for item i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
W.l.o.g., assume xi ≥ xi+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. Player 1 doesn’t get any item if and only
if y ≥ x1. So, with probability F (x1), she gets at least one item and she pays at least
x1. Therefore, her expected utility is at most F (x1)(v − x1) = v − 1/m, (but it would
be strictly less if she is charged nonzero payments for other items). This means that
bidding only x1 for one item and zero for the rest of them dominates the strategy we
have assumed.
If player 2 bids a common bid y for all items, where y ∈ [0, 1/m], she gets m items
with probability G(y) and m − 1 items with probability 1 − G(y). Her expected utility
is G(y)(2 −my) + (1 − G(y))(1 − (m − 1)y) = G(y)(1 − y) + 1 − (m − 1)y = 1. We show
that player 2 cannot get a utility higher than 1 by using any deviating bids. Suppose
now that player 2 bids yi for item i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Player 1 bids for item i (according to
G(x)) with probability 1/m. We also use that since G is a CDF, for x > 1/m holds that
G(x) = 1 < (m−1)x1−x . So, the expected utility of player 2 is
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1
m
m∑
i=1
G(yi)
2− m∑
j=1
yj
+ (1−G(yi))
1− m∑
j=1
j 6=i
yj


=
1
m
m∑
i=1
G(yi)(1− yi) + 1− m∑
j=1
j 6=i
yj

≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
 (m− 1)yi1− yi (1− yi) + 1−
m∑
j=1
j 6=i
yj

=
1
m
m∑
i=1
myi + 1− m∑
j=1
yj

=
1
m
m m∑
i=1
yi +m−m
m∑
j=1
yj
 = 1.
Overall, we proved that B is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
It is easy to see that the optimal allocation gives all items to player 2, and has social
welfare 2. In the Nash equilibrium B, player 2 bids 0 with probability 1− 1mv , so, with
at least this probability, player 1 gets one item.
SW (B) ≤
(
1− 1
mv
)
(v + 1) +
1
mv
2 = 1 + v +
1
mv
− 1
m
If we set v = 1/
√
m, then SW (B) ≤ 1 + 2√
m
− 1m . So, PoA≥ 21+ 2√
m
− 1m
which, for large
m, converges to 2.
5. ADDITIVE VALUATIONS
For additive valuations, we show that mixed Nash equilibria are efficient, whenever
they exist. This implies an interesting separation between mixed equilibria with full
information and Bayesian equilibria, that are known not to be efficient [Krishna 2002].
For the sake of completeness, we present a lower bound of 1.06 for the Bayesian PoA of
single-item auctions, in Appendix A.
5.1. The PoA for single item auctions is 1
We consider a first-price single-item auction, where the valuations of the players for
the item are given by (v1, v2, . . . , vn). We show that the PoA in mixed strategies is 1.
For any mixed Nash equilibrium of strategies B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn), let Bi denote the
probability measure of the distribution of bid bi; in particular, Bi(I) = P[bi ∈ I] for
any real interval I. The corresponding cumulative distribution function (CDF) of bi is
denoted by Gi (i.e., Gi(x) = Bi((−∞, x])). Recall that for a given B, for every bidder
i ∈ [n], Fi(bi) denotes the CDF of maxj 6=ibj . We also use ϕi(bi) to denote the probability
that player i gets the item with bid bi. Note that ϕ(bi) ≤ Fi(bi), due to a possible tie at
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bi. Therefore, if he bids bi, then his expected utility is
E[ui(bi)] = E
b−i∼B−i
[ui(bi)] = ϕi(bi)(vi − bi) ≤ Fi(bi)(vi − bi).
Let E[ui] = Eb∼B[ui] denote his overall expected utility defined by the (Lebesgue) in-
tegral E[ui] =
∫
(−∞,∞) ϕi(x)(vi − x)dBi. Furthermore, assuming P[bi ∈ I] > 0 for some
interval I, let E[ui|bi ∈ I] = Eb∼B[ui|bi ∈ I] be the expected utility of i, on condition
that his bid is in I. By definition
E[ui|bi ∈ I] =
∫
I
ϕi(x)(vi − x)dBi
P[bi ∈ I] ≤
∫
I
Fi(x)(vi − x)dBi
P[bi ∈ I] .
The next lemma follows from the definition of (mixed) Nash equilibria. It states that
in equilibrium the excepted utility of any player i, conditioned on the event bi ∈ I,must
be equal to his overall expected utility, given that he bids with positive probability in
the interval I.
LEMMA 5.1. In any mixed Nash equilibrium B, for every player i holds that if
P[bi ∈ I] > 0 , then E[ui|bi ∈ I] = E[ui].
PROOF. Assume that E[ui|bi ∈ I] > E[ui]. Then, the player would be better off
by submitting bids only in the interval I (according to the distribution B′i(I ′) =
Bi(I
′)/Bi(I) for all I ′ ⊂ I). If E[ui|bi ∈ I] < E[ui], the proof is analogous: in this case the
player would be better off by bidding outside the interval. Both cases would contradict
B being a Nash equilibrium.
In the next lemma we show that for any two players with positive utility, the in-
fimum of their bids must be equal, and they both bid higher than this value with
probability 1. Intuitively, if a player has non-zero utility, then his lowest possible bid
cannot be lower than any player’s lowest bid.
LEMMA 5.2. Assume that in a mixed Nash equilibrium B there are bidders i and
j, with positive utilities E[ui] > 0, and E[uj ] > 0. Let qi = infx{Gi(x) > 0} and qj =
infx{Gj(x) > 0}. Then qi = qj = q, and Gi(q) = Gj(q) = 0, consequently Fi(q) = Fj(q) =
0.
PROOF. Assume w.l.o.g. that qi > qj . Note that, by the definition of qj , player j bids
with positive probability in the interval I = [qj , qi).
On the other hand, Fj(x) = 0 over interval I, since (at least) player i bids higher
than x with probability 1. This implies E[uj |bj ∈ I] = 0. Using Lemma 5.1 we obtain
E[uj ] = E[uj |bj ∈ I] = 0, contradicting our assumptions. This proves qi = qj = q.
Next we show Gi(q) = Gj(q) = 0. Observe first, that because of E[uj ] > 0, vj > q and
vi > q must hold, since q is the smallest possible bid of j and of i. Assume now that
Gi(q) > 0 and Gj(q) = 0. Then, P[bi = q] > 0, but E[ui|bi = q] = 0, since j bids higher.
This contradicts again Lemma 5.1 for the interval [q, q].
Second, assume that Gi(q) > 0 and Gj(q) > 0. In case bi = bj = q, bidder i or bidder j
receives the item with probability smaller than 1. W.l.o.g., we assume it is player i. In
this case bidder i is better off by bidding q +  for a small enough  instead of bidding
q, since in case of bids bi = q + , and bj = q, he gets the item for sure. This contradicts
B being a Nash equilibrium, and altogether we conclude Gi(q) = Gj(q) = 0.
Finally, this immediately implies Fi(q) = Fj(q) = 0, since for both i and j, (at least)
the other one bids higher than q with probability 1.
Finally, we prove that mixed equilibria are always efficient. We use the above lemma
to show that all players who have non-zero utility, must have maximum valuation.
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THEOREM 5.3. In a single-item auction the PoA of mixed Nash equilibria is 1.
PROOF. Let vi be the maximum valuation in the single item auction with full-
information. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a mixed Nash equilibriumB has
Eb∈B[SW (b)] < SW (OPT ) = vi. Then, there is a nonempty set of bidders J ⊂ [n] \ {i},
who all get the item with positive probability in B, moreover vk < vi holds for all k ∈ J.
Let j ∈ J denote the player with maximum valuation vj < vi among players in J.
We show that E[ui] > 0, and E[uj ] > 0. Let us first consider the distribution Fi(x) of
the maximum bid in b−i. If Fi(vi − δ) = 0 for all δ > 0, then the highest bid in b−i, and
thus the payment of player j is at least vi > vj whenever j wins the item. Thus for his
utility E[uj ] < 0, contradicting that B is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, there exists a
small δ, such that Fi(vi − δ) > 0. This implies E[ui] > 0, because by bidding vi − δ/2
only, player i would have higher than 0 utility.
Now assume for the sake of contradiction that E[uj ] = 0 (E[uj ] < 0 is impossible in
an equilibrium). Note that Fj(vj) > 0, otherwise j would get the item with positive
probability, but always for a price higher than vj . On the other hand, if there were a
small δ′ such that Fj(vj − δ′) > 0, then j could improve his 0 utility by bidding vj − δ′/2
only. The latter implies, that j can get the item (with positive probability) only with
bids vj or higher, so he never bids higher so as to avoid negative expected utility. We
obtained that ϕj(vj) > 0, where ϕj(vj) denotes the probability of j winning the item
with bid vj .
Moreover, Fj(vj − δ′) = 0 for all δ′ > 0 implies that the minimum bid of at least one
player k is at least vj (infx{Gk(x) > 0} ≥ vj). Therefore the winning bids of player
i are also at least vj (both when i = k, and when i 6= k). But then i could improve
his utility by overbidding the (with positive probabilty) winning bid vj of j, that is,
by bidding exactly vj +  (instead of ≤ vj + ) with probability Gi(vj + ) for a small
enough . With this bid, the additional utility of i would get arbitrarily close to (at
least) ϕj(vj)(vi − vj) > 0.
Thus, we established the existence of players i and j, with different valuations vj <
vi, and both with strictly positive expected utility inB. According to Lemma 5.2, for the
infimum of these two players’ bids qi = qj = q, and Fi(q) = Fj(q) = 0 hold. Furthermore,
q < vj < vi, otherwise the utility of j could not be positive. By the definition of qi = q,
for any  > 0 it holds that P[q ≤ bi < q + ] > 0. Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, and by the
definition of conditional expectation, for the interval I = [q, q + ) we have
E[ui] = E[ui|bi ∈ I] ≤
∫
I
Fi(x)(vi − x)dBi
P[bi ∈ I]
<
∫
I
Fi(q + )(vi − q)dBi
P[bi ∈ I] = Fi(q + )(vi − q).
Rearranging terms, this yields Fi(q + ) > E[ui]/(vi − q) > 0 for arbitrary  > 0. Since
Fi(x) as a cumulative distribution function is right-continuous in every point, this
positive lower bound must hold for Fi(q) as well, contradicting Fi(q) = 0.
5.2. Upper bound for additive valuations
We extend the above proof for additive valuations.
THEOREM 5.4. For simultaneous first-price auctions with additive valuations the
PoA of mixed Nash equilibria is 1.
PROOF. Let B be a mixed Nash equilibrium in the m item case. We argue first that
for any fixed bidder i, it is without loss of generality to assume that in Bi his bids
for each item are drawn from independent distributions. If this were not the case,
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we could determine the distribution Bji of bi(j) for any item to have the same CDF
Gji as the distribution of bids for this item in Bi. Then we would replace Bi by the
product distribution for the items B′i = ×Bji . Since both the expected valuation and
the expected payment for item j would remain the same in this new strategy, and
the valuation and utility of the player are the sum of valuations and utilities over
the items, none of these amounts would be affected. Furthermore the same additivity
holds for any other player k, whose ’price function’ F jk (·) for item j would also not be
influenced. Thus, with Bi replaced by the strategy B′i, the mixed profile B′ = (B′i, B−i)
would remain a mixed Nash with the same expected social welfare as B.
The remaining argument is similar. Now the distribution of bids (Bji )i∈[n] for any
particular item j corresponds to a mixed Nash equilibrium of the single item auction
for this item. Otherwise a player could improve his utility for j, and consequently
the sum of his utilities for all items. In turn, by Theorem 5.3 this implies that the
social welfare for each item j is optimal, a player (or players) with maximum valuation
receive the item, which concludes the proof.
6. BID-DEPENDENT AUCTIONS
Here we generalize some of our results to simultaneous bid-dependent auctions. In-
tuitively, a single item auction is bid-dependent if the winner is always the highest
bidder, and a bidder’s payment depends only on whether she gets the item or not, and
on her own bid. For instance, the first-price auction and the all-pay auction are bid-
dependent but the second-price auction is not.
For a given simultaneous bid-dependent auction, we will denote by qwj (x) and qlj(x)
a bidder’s payment pij(b) for item j when her bid for j is x, depending on whether she
is the winner or a loser, respectively. Note that we assume qwj (x) (resp. qlj(x)) to be the
same for all bidders. Without this assumption the PoA is unbounded, as we show in
Appendix B. To guarantee the existence of reasonable Nash Equilibria, we also make
the following natural assumptions about qwj (x) and qlj(x):11
– qwj (x) and qlj(x) are non-decreasing, continuous functions of x and normalized, such
that qlj(0) = qwj (0) = 0;
– qwj (x) ≥ qlj(x) for all x ≥ 0;
– qwk (x) > 0 for some x (to avoid the case of all payments being zero, for that no Nash
equilibria exist).
6.1. Fractionally Subadditive valuations
6.1.1. Upper Bounds. In this section we discuss the general upper bound for simulta-
neous bid-dependent auctions.
We define θ as θ = maxj∈[m] sup{x:qwj (x) 6=0}{qlj(x)/qwj (x)}.
Observe that θ ∈ [0, 1], due to the assumption qlj(x) ≤ qwj (x). We will prove that
(for θ 6= 1) the coarse-correlated and the Bayesian PoA of simultaneous bid-dependent
auctions with fractionally subadditive bidders is at most (θ−1)
2
θ2−θ+1−eθ−1 . When we set
θ = 0 or θ → 1, we get back the upper bounds of e/(e− 1) for first-price auctions, and 2
for all-pay auctions, respectively.
We start by proving a lemma for a single item, analogous to Lemma 3.3.
11Similar assumptions are also made in [Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2012], [Lizzeri and Persico 2000] and
[Bresky 2008].
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LEMMA 6.1. Consider a single item bid-dependent auction with payment functions
qw(x) and ql(x). Let B be an arbitrary randomized bidding profile, and Fi denote the
CDF of the random variable maxk 6=i bk, for this B. Then for every bidder i, and non-
negative value v, there exists a pure bidding strategy a = a(v,B−i) such that,
Fi(a)
(
v − qw(a) + ql(a))− ql(a) + ∑
k∈[n]
pk(B) ≥ θ
2 − θ + 1− eθ−1
(θ − 1)2 · v,
where pk(B) = Eb∼B[pk(b)] is the expected payment from player k.
PROOF. Let a = arg maxx
{
Fi(x)
(
v − qw(x) + ql(x))− ql(x)} and A =
Fi(a)
(
v − qw(a) + ql(a)) − ql(a). In the following we use that Fi is the CDF of
maxk 6=i bk, and since qw(·) is continuous, E[qw(maxk 6=i bk)] =
∫∞
0
(1−Fi(x))dqw(x) holds.
A+
∑
k
pk(B) ≥ A+ E
b
[qw(max
k 6=i
bk)]
= A+
∫ ∞
0
(1− Fi(x))dqw(x)
≥ A+
∫ ∞
0
(
1− A+ q
l(x)
v − qw(x) + ql(x)
)
dqw(x)
≥ A+
∫ ∞
0
(
v −A− qw(x)
v + (θ − 1)qw(x)
)
dqw(x)
≥ A+
∫ v−A
0
(
v −A− y
v + (θ − 1)y
)
dy
The second inequality follows from the definition of A and a and the third one
is due to the fact that qlj(x) ≤ θ · qwj (x) for any x. For the last one, qw(0) = 0
and we further need to show that for x0 = ∞, qw(x0) ≥ v − A: by definition
A ≥ Fi(x0)
(
v − qw(x0) + ql(x0)
) − ql(x0) = v − qw(x0) since F (x0) = 1, meaning that
qw(x0) ≥ v − A. For completeness we also show that v − A ≥ 0, by showing that
v ≥ A ≥ 0: observe that A = Fi(a)v − Fi(a)qw(a) − (1 − Fi(a))ql(a) ≤ v, since Fi is
a CDF; moreover A ≥ Fi(0)
(
v − qw(0) + ql(0))− ql(0) = Fi(0)v ≥ 0.
In case θ < 1, A+
∑
k pkj(B) ≥ A+ (A+θ(v−A))(ln(A+θ(v−A))−ln(v))−(θ−1)(v−A)(θ−1)2 , which is
minimized for A = v(θ·e
1−θ−1)
(θ−1)e1−θ . The lemma follows by replacing A with this value.
In case θ = 1, A+
∑
k pkj(B) ≥ A+ (v−A)
2
2v ≥ 12v. The limit of θ
2−θ+1−eθ−1
(θ−1)2 when θ → 1
is 12 .
In the following, let fSi (·) be a maximizing additive function of set S for player i
with fractionally subadditive valuation function vi. By the definition of fractionally
subadditive valuations, we have that vi(T ) ≥ fSi (T ), for every T ⊆ S and fSi (S) = vi(S).
LEMMA 6.2. For any set S of items, and any strategy profile b, where bij = 0 for
j /∈ S,
ui(b) ≥
∑
j∈S
(
P[j ∈ Xi(b)]
(
fSi (j)− qwj (bij) + qlj(bij)
)− qlj(bij)).
PROOF.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: October 2015.
X:18 George Christodoulou et al.
ui(b) ≥
∑
T⊆S
P[Xi(b) = T ]
fSi (T )−∑
j∈T
qwj (bij)−
∑
j∈SrT
qlj(bij)

=
∑
T⊆S
∑
j∈T
P[Xi(b) = T ]
(
fSi (j)− qwj (bij)
)−∑
T⊆S
∑
j∈SrT
P[Xi(b) = T ]qlj(bij)
=
∑
j∈S
∑
T⊆S:j∈T
P[Xi(b) = T ]
(
fSi (j)− qwj (bij)
)−∑
j∈S
∑
T⊆S:j /∈T
P[Xi(b) = T ]qlj(bij)
=
∑
j∈S
P[j ∈ Xi(b)]
(
fSi (j)− qwj (bij)
)−∑
j∈S
P[j /∈ Xi(b)]qlj(bij)
=
∑
j∈S
(
P[j ∈ Xi(b)](fSi (j)− qwj (bij) + qlj(bij))− qlj(bij)
)
.
LEMMA 6.3. Let B be a coarse correlated equilibrium of a simultaneous bid-
dependent auction. For any set of items S and any pure strategy b′i of player i, where
b′ij = 0 for j /∈ S,
ui(B) = E
b∼B
[ui(b)] ≥
∑
j∈S
(
Fij(b
′
ij)
(
fSi (j)− qwj (b′ij) + qlj(b′ij)
)− qlj(b′ij)).
The proof of the lemma is analogous to that of Lemma 3.2: Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥
Eb∼B[ui((b′i,b−i))] holds since B is an equilibrium; then Lemma 6.2 is applied to
(b′i,b−i), and expectation is taken over b ∼ B.
THEOREM 6.4. For bidders with fractionally subadditive valuations, the coarse cor-
related PoA of any bid-dependent auction is at most (θ−1)
2
θ2−θ+1−eθ−1 .
PROOF. Let B be a coarse correlated equilibrium, and let λ(θ) = θ
2−θ+1−eθ−1
(θ−1)2 . For
every player i, consider the maximizing additive valuation, fOii for his optimal set Oi.
By Lemma 6.1, for every fixed player i and item j there exists a bid aij such that
Fij(aij)
(
fOii (j)− qwj (aij) + qlj(aij)
)
− qlj(aij) ≥ λ(θ)fOii (j)−
∑
k
pkj(B)
For player i, we consider the deviation that her bid is aij for every item in Oi (and 0
for all other items), and apply Lemma 6.3. Combined with the above inequality (for all
items in Oi), we obtain
ui(B) ≥ λ(θ)
∑
j∈Oi
fOii (j)−
∑
j∈Oi
∑
k
pkj(B) = λ(θ)vi(O
v
i )−
∑
j∈Oi
∑
k
pkj(B).
By summing over all players, we get∑
i
ui(B) ≥ λ(θ)
∑
i
vi(O
v
i )−
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k
pkj(B) = λ(θ)SW (O)−
∑
k
pk(B)
The theorem follows from SW (B) =
∑
i ui(B) +
∑
i pi(B).
Similarly to Lemmas 3.2 and 6.3, we can prove the following.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: October 2015.
Tight Bounds for the PoA of Simultaneous First Price Auctions X:19
LEMMA 6.5. Assume that B be is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and let S be an
arbitrary set of items. For player i with valuation vi, let b′i be a pure strategy such that
b′ij = 0 for j /∈ S. Then,
E
v−i
b∼B(v)
[uvii (b)] ≥
∑
j∈S
(
F viij (b
′
ij)(f
S
vi(j)− qwj (b′ij) + qlj(b′ij))− qlj(b′ij)
)
.
THEOREM 6.6. The Bayesian PoA of any bid-dependent auction, when the bid-
ders have fractionally subadditive and independently distributed valuations, is at most
(θ−1)2
θ2−θ+1−eθ−1 .
PROOF. Let λ(θ) = θ
2−θ+1−eθ−1
(θ−1)2 . Suppose that B is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
and the valuation of each player i is drawn according to vi ∼ Di, where the Di are
independently distributed. We use the notation C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) to denote the
bidding distribution inBwhich involves the randomness of the valuations v, and of the
bidding strategy B(v), that is bi(vi) ∼ Ci. Then the utility of player i with valuation vi
can be expressed by ui(Bi(vi),C−i) = Ebi∼Bi(vi),b−i∼C−i [ui(b)]. It should be noted that
C−i does not depend on a particular v−i (just on the distribution D). Also notice that
the following equality holds: Ev−i [u
vi
i (Bi(vi),B−i(v−i))] = u
vi
i (Bi(vi),C−i)
12.
For any player i and any fractionally subadditive valuation vi ∈ Vi, consider the
following deviation: consider some v′−i ∼ D−i and then for every j ∈ O(vi,v′−i) bid
aj(vi,C−i) as defined in Lemma 6.1. By applying Lemma 6.5 for S = Oi(vi,v′−i), taking
expectation over vi and v′−i and summing over all players, we have that∑
i
E
v
[uvii (B(v))]
=
∑
i
E
v
[uvii (Bi(vi),C−i)]
≥
∑
i
E
vi,v
′
−i
 ∑
j∈Oi(vi,v′−i)
(
F viij (aij)
(
f
Oi(vi,v
′
−i)
vi (j)− qwj (aij) + qlj(aij)
)
− qlj(aij)
)
=
∑
i
E
v′
 ∑
j∈Oi(v′)
(
F
v′i
ij (aij)
(
f
Oi(v
′)
v′i
(j)− qwj (aij) + qlj(aij)
)
− qlj(aij)
)
≥
∑
i
E
v′
 ∑
j∈Oi(v′)
(
λ(θ) · fOi(v′)v′i (j)−
∑
k
pkj(Bi(vi),C−i)
)
= λ(θ) ·
∑
i
E
v
[vi(O
v
i )]−
∑
i
∑
j
pkj(C)
The last inequality follows by Lemma 6.1.
So, Ev[SW (B(v))] =
∑
i Ev[ui(B)] +
∑
i
∑
j pkj(C) ≥ λ(θ) · Ev[SW (Ov)].
6.1.2. Lower Bound. Here we present a lower bound of ee−1 for the PoA of simultaneous
bid-dependent auctions with OXS valuations and for mixed equilibria. This implies
12Ev−i [u
vi
i (B(v))] = Ebi∼Bi(vi) E v−i
b−i∼B−i(v−i)
[u
vi
i (bi, b−i)] = Ebi∼Bi(vi) Eb−i∼C−i [u
vi
i (bi, b−i)] =
u
vi
i (Bi(vi),C−i)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: October 2015.
X:20 George Christodoulou et al.
a lower bound for submodular and fractionally subadditive valuations, as well as for
more general classes of equilibria.
THEOREM 6.7. The PoA of simultaneous bid-dependent auctions with full informa-
tion and OXS valuations is at least ee−1 ≈ 1.58.
PROOF. The proof is very similar to the one for simultaneous first price auctions
(Section 3.2). Therefore, here we only point out the differences. The same construction
applies here; the only difference appears in the Nash strategy profile and in a scaling
of the valuations.
We choose an appropriate value V , such that V
(
1− (n−1n )n−1) is in the range of
qwj (·) for all j (notice that due to our assumptions on qwj , there exists such a V ). We
consider the same set of players and items as in Section 3.2; the valuation functions of
the players are the same as in Section 3.2, except that each valuation is multiplied by
V. Also, the same tie breaking rule applies.
As for the mixed Nash equilibrium B, the dummy player still bids 0 for every item
and every real player still picks an n − 1 dimensional slice in the same random way.
However the bid xj that she bids for every item j of that slice is drawn according to a
distribution with the following item-specific CDF (we will show below that Gj is a valid
CDF):
Gj(x) = n
(
V
(
n−1
n
)n−1
+ qlj(x)
V − qwj (x) + qlj(x)
) 1
n−1
− n+ 1, x ∈ [0, Tj ]
where Tj is the bid such that qwj (Tj) = V
(
1− (n−1n )n−1). Notice that we can no longer
require that the bids of a player on different items are equal, since the CDFs Gj are
different. Instead, we require that for every real player the bids xj for different items
in her slice are correlated in the following way: she chooses ρ uniformly at random
from the interval [0, 1], and then sets xj = G−1j (ρ), for every j in her slice. Note that
for any two items j1, j2 of the slice, it holds that Gj1(x1) = Gj2(x2) = ρ and xj1 is not
necessarily equal to xj2 . However, for each item j in the slice, the way that xj is chosen
is equivalent to sampling it according to the CDF Gj(xj) (but in a correlated way to
the other bids). The fact that each player’s bids are such that the CDF values become
equal, will be sufficient for proving that B is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
The probability Fj(x) that a player gets item j if she bids x for it is:
Fj(x) =
(
Gj(x)
n
+
n− 1
n
)n−1
=
V
(
n−1
n
)n−1
+ qlj(x)
V − qwj (x) + qlj(x)
, x ∈ [0, Tj ]
Recall that the valuation of player i is additive, restricted to the slice of items that
she bids for in a particular bi. Therefore the expected utility of i when he bids x in bi
for item j is Fj(x)(V − qwj (x)) − (1 − Fj(x))qlj(x) = Fj(x)(V − qwj (x) + qlj(x)) − qlj(x) =
V
(
n−1
n
)n−1. By comprising all items, E[ui(bi)] = V nn−1 (n−1n )n−1.
CLAIM 6.8. B is a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. First, we fix an arbitrary w−i ∈ [n]n−1, and focus on the set of items C :=
{(`, w−i) | ` ∈ [n]}, which we call a column for player i. Recall that i is interested in
getting only one item within C, on the other hand his valuation is additive over items
from different columns. Moreover, in a fixed b−i, every other player k submits bids xj
resulting in equal values of Gj(xj) for all items in C, because either the whole C is in
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the current slice of k, and he bids correlated bids on them, or no item from the column
is in the slice and he bids 0.
Consider first a deviating bid, in which i bids a positive value for more than one
items in C, say (at least) the values x1, x2 > 0 for items j1, j2, respectively, and w.l.o.g.
assume that Gj1(x1) is maximum over items in C. We prove that if she loses item j1
she should lose item j2 as well: if she loses j1, then there must be a bidder k with bid
x′1 > x1 for item j1. Since Gj1(x) is increasing, this implies Gj1(x′1) > Gj1(x1). However,
since the bids of player k are correlated (and j2 is in his slice as well), for his bid x′2 on
j2 it holds that Gj2(x′2) = Gj1(x′1) > Gj1(x1) ≥ Gj2(x2). Therefore, x′2 > x2, so player
i cannot win item j2 either, so bidding for item j2 cannot contribute to the valuation,
whereas the bidder might pay for more items than j1. Consequently, bidding for only
one item in C and 0 for the rest of C is more profitable.
Second, observe that restricted to a fixed column, submitting any bid x ∈ [0, Tj ] for
one arbitrary item j results in the constant expected utility of V
(
n−1
n
)n−1, whereas by
bidding higher than Tj the utility would be at most V − qwj (Tj) = V
(
n−1
n
)n−1 for this
column. In summary, bidding for exactly one item j from each column, an arbitrary bid
x ∈ [0, Tj ] is a best response for i yielding the above expected utility, which concludes
the proof that B is a Nash equilibrium.
The rest of the argument is exactly the same as in the proof for first price auctions,
with both SW (B) and SW (O) scaled by V, that cancels out in the price of anarchy.
It remains to prove that the Gj(·) are valid cumulative distribution functions for
every j. To this end it is sufficient to show that Gj(Tj) = 1 and that Gj(x) is non-
decreasing in [0, Tj ]. For simplicity we skip index j.
G(T ) = n
(
V
(
n−1
n
)n−1
+ ql(T )
V − qw(T ) + ql(T )
) 1
n−1
− n+ 1 =
= n
 V (n−1n )n−1 + ql(T )
V − V
(
1− (n−1n )n−1)+ ql(T )
 1n−1 − n+ 1 = 1
Now let x1, x2 ∈ [0, Tj ], and x1 > x2. In order to prove G(x1) ≥ G(x2), it is sufficient to
prove that V (
n−1
n )
n−1
+ql(x1)
V−qw(x1)+ql(x1) ≥
V (n−1n )
n−1
+ql(x2)
V−qw(x2)+ql(x2) .
V
(
n−1
n
)n−1
+ ql(x1)
V − qw(x1) + ql(x1) −
V
(
n−1
n
)n−1
+ ql(x2)
V − qw(x2) + ql(x2)
=
ql(x1)(V − V
(
n−1
n
)n−1 − qw(x2))− ql(x2)(V − V (n−1n )n−1 − qw(x1))
(V − qw(x1) + ql(x1))(V − qw(x2) + ql(x2))
≥ (q
l(x1)− ql(x2))(V − V
(
n−1
n
)n−1 − qw(x1))
(V − qw(x1) + ql(x1))(V − qw(x2) + ql(x2)) ≥ 0
The last two inequalities follow from the monotonicity of ql and qw, and from the fact
that V
(
1− (n−1n )n−1) ≥ qw(x1) holds by the definition of Tj .
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6.2. Subadditive valuations
We prove tight bounds for the PoA in simultaneous bid-dependent auctions with subad-
ditive bidder valuations. We show that the coarse-correlated and the Bayesian PoA is
exactly 2.Our results hold even for a class of auctions more general than bid-dependent
auctions: we allow the payment rule to depend on the rank of the bid, where the rth
highest bid (with an arbitrary tie-breaking rule) has rank r. We use qj(x, r) to de-
note the payment that the bidder should pay for item j when her bid is x and gets
rank r. In particular, given a mixed bidding strategy B, bidder i’s expected payment
pi(B) is equal to
∑
j∈[m] Eb[qj(bij , ri(bj)] where ri(bj) denotes the rank of bij among
{b1j , . . . , bnj}. That is, pij(B) = Eb[qj(bij , ri(bj)]. Note that qwj (x) from the previous
subsection is qj(x, 1) here, and qlj(x) can be different for different ranks. Analogous as-
sumptions to the ones made on qwj (x) and qlj(x) can be made on qj(x, r) as well. For the
following upper bound we only assume that the qj(., r) are normalized and increasing,
and qj(x, 1) ≥ qj(x, r).
6.2.1. Upper Bounds
LEMMA 6.9. For any simultaneous bid-dependent auction, subadditive valuation
profile v and randomized bidding profile B, there exists a randomized bid vector
Ai(v,B−i) for each player i, such that for the total expected utility and expected pay-
ments of the bidders
∑
i
ui(Ai(v,B−i),B−i) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(O
v
i )−
∑
i
∑
j
pij(B)
holds, where Ovi is the optimal set of player i.
PROOF. Under the profile v, Ovi is the set of items allocated to player i in the op-
timum. We denote by hj(b) = arg maxi bij the bidder with the highest bid for item j,
regarding the pure bidding b. Let tij be the maximum of bids for item j among players
other than i, and ti be the vector such that its jth coordinate equals tij if j ∈ Ovi , and 0
otherwise. Note that ti ∼ Ti is an induced random variable of B−i. We define the ran-
domized bid Ai(v,B−i) to follow the same distribution Ti (inspired by [Feldman et al.
2013]).
We use the notation vi(bi, ti) and Wi(bi, ti) to denote the player i’s valuation and
winning set when she bids bi and the prices are ti, i.e., vi(S) and Wi(S) where S =
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{j|bij ≥ tij}.
ui(Ai(v,B−i),B−i)
= E
ai∼Ai
E
b−i∼B−i
[ui(ai,b−i)]
≥ E
ai∼Ti
E
ti∼Ti
[vi(ai, ti)]−
∑
j∈Ovi
E
ai∼Ti
[qj(aij , 1)] (since qj(x, 1) ≥ qj(x, r))
= E
ti∼Ti
E
ai∼Ti
[vi(ti, ai)]−
∑
j∈Ovi
E
ti∼Ti
[qj(tij , 1)] (swap ti and ai)
=
1
2
E
ti∼Ti
E
ai∼Ti
[vi(ti, ai) + vi(ai, ti)]−
∑
j∈Ovi
E
ti∼Ti
[qj(tij , 1)]
≥ 1
2
vi(O
v
i )−
∑
j∈Ovi
E
b∼B
[qj(bhj(b)(j), 1)]
≥ 1
2
vi(O
v
i )−
∑
j∈Ovi
E
b∼B
[qj(bhj(b)(j), 1)]
−
∑
j∈Ovi
E
b∼B
[∑
k
qj(bk(j), rk(b
j))− qj(bhj(b)(j), rhj(b)(bj))
]
=
1
2
vi(O
v
i )−
∑
j∈Ovi
∑
k
E
b∼B
[qj(bk, r(k,b))] =
1
2
vi(O
v
i )−
∑
j∈Ovi
∑
k
pkj(B)
In the second inequality vi(ti, ai) + vi(ai, ti) ≥ vi(Ovi ) is due to the subadditivity of vi;
for qj(tij , 1) ≤ qj(bhj(b)(j), 1) we use that qj(., 1) is non-decreasing, and the fact that
tij ≤ bhj(b)(j), since in bhj(b)(j), for computing the maximum we also consider player
i. For the last inequality, notice that
∑
k qj(bk(j), rk(b
j)) − qj(bhj(b)(j), rhj(b)(bj)) ≥ 0,
since from the sum of all payments for item j we subtracted the payment of the winner.
The lemma follows by summing over all players.
THEOREM 6.10. For bidders with subadditive valuations, the coarse correlated PoA
of any bid-dependent auction is at most 2.
PROOF. Suppose B is a coarse correlated equilibrium (notice that v is fixed). By
Lemma 6.9 and the definition of coarse correlated equilibrium, we have∑
i
ui(B) ≥
∑
i
ui(Ai(v,B−i),B−i) ≥ 1
2
∑
i
vi(O
v
i )−
∑
i
∑
j
pij(B).
By rearranging the terms, SW (B) =
∑
i ui(B) +
∑
i
∑
j pij(B) ≥ 1/2 · SW (O).
THEOREM 6.11. For bidders with subadditive and independent valuations, the
Bayesian PoA of any bid-dependent auction is at most 2.
PROOF. Suppose B is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and the valuation of each
player i is vi ∼ Di, where the Di are independently distributed. We use the nota-
tion C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) to denote the bidding distribution in B which includes the
randomness of the valuations v, and of the bidding strategy b, that is bi(vi) ∼ Ci
(like in the proof of Theorem 6.6). Then the utility of player i with valuation vi
can be expressed by ui(Bi(vi),C−i). For any player i and any subadditive valua-
tion vi ∈ Vi, consider the following deviation: sampling v′−i ∼ D−i and bidding
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Ai((vi,v
′
−i),C−i) as defined in Lemma 6.9. By the definition of Nash equilibrium, we
have Ev−i [u
vi
i (Bi(vi),B−i(v−i))] ≥ Ev′−i [uvii (Ai((vi,v′−i),C−i),C−i)]. By taking expecta-
tion over vi and summing over all players,∑
i
E
v
[ui(B(v))] ≥
∑
i
E
vi,v′−i
[uvii (Ai((vi,v
′
−i),C−i),C−i)]
= E
v
[∑
i
uvii (Ai(v,C−i),C−i)
]
(by relabeling v′−i by v−i)
≥ 1
2
·
∑
i
E
v
[vi(O
v
i )]−
∑
i
∑
j
E
v
[pkj(B(v))]
where the inequality follows by Lemma 6.9. We obtained Ev[SW (B(v))] =∑
i Ev[ui(B)] +
∑
i
∑
j Ev[pkj(B(v))] ≥ 1/2 · Ev[SW (Ov)].
6.2.2. Lower Bound
THEOREM 6.12. For bidders with subbaditive valuations, the mixed PoA of simul-
taneous bid-dependent auctions is at least 2.
PROOF. We consider 2 players and m items. Let v and V (with v < V ) be positive
reals to be defined later. Player 1 has value v for every non-empty subset of items;
player 2 values with V any non-empty strict subset of the items and with 2V the whole
set of items. Consider now the mixed strategy profile B, where player 1 picks item l
uniformly at random and bids xl for it and 0 for the rest of the items, whereas, player
2 bids yj for every item j. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, xj and yj are drawn from distributions with
the following CDFs Gj(x) and Fj(y), respectively:
Gj(x) =
(m− 1)qwj (x) + qlj(x)
V − qwj (x) + qlj(x)
, x ∈ [0, Tj ]; Fj(y) =
v − V/m+ qlj(y)
v − qwj (y) + qlj(y)
, y ∈ [0, Tj ],
where Tj is the bid such that qwj (Tj) = V/m. We choose V such that V/m is in the
range of qwj (·) for all j (notice that due to the assumptions on qwj , there always exists
such a value V ). Furthermore, in B, the yj ’s are correlated in the following way: player
2 chooses ρ uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1] and if ρ ∈
[
0, v−V/mv
)
then
yj = 0, otherwise yj = F−1j (ρ), for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m.13 Note that for every two items j1,
j2, it holds that Fj1(yj1) = Fj2(yj2). In case of a tie, player 2 gets the item. Due to the
continuity of qwj and qlj , Gj(x) and Fj(x) are continuous and therefore none of the CDF
have a mass point in any x 6= 0.
We show below that B is a Nash equilibrium, and each of the Fj and Gj are valid
cumulative distributions. The PoA can then be derived as follows. Player 2 bids 0 with
probability 1 − Vmv so, E[SW (B)] ≤
(
1− Vmv
)
(V + v) + Vmv2V = V + v +
V 2
mv − Vm . For
v = V/
√
m, PoA ≥ 2V
V+ 2V√
m
− Vm
= 2
1+ 2√
m
− 1m
which, for large m, converges to 2.
CLAIM 6.13. B is a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. If player 1 bids any x in the range of (0, Tj ] for a single item j and zero for
the rest, her utility is Fj(x)(v− qwj (x))+(1−Fj(x))(−qlj(x)) = Fj(x)(v− qwj (x)+ qlj(x))−
qlj(x) = v−V/m. Since G(0) = 0, her utility is also v−V/m if she bids according to G(·).
13For each item j, the way player 2 chooses yj is equivalent to picking it according to the CDF Fj(y).
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Suppose player 1 bids x = (x1, . . . , xm), (xj ∈ [0, Tj ]) with at least two positive bids.
W.l.o.g., assume F1(x1) = maxi Fi(xi). If y1 ≥ x1, player 1 doesn’t get any item, since for
every j, Fj(yj) = F1(y1) ≥ F1(x1) ≥ Fj(xj) and so yj ≥ xj (recall that in any tie player
2 gets the item). If y1 < x1, player 1 gets at least the first item and has valuation v,
but she cannot pay less than qw1 (x1). So, this strategy is dominated by the strategy
of bidding x1 for the first item and zero for the rest. Bidding xj > Tj for any item
guarantees the item but results in a utility less than v−qwj (xj) ≤ v−qwj (Tj) = v−V/m,
so it is dominated by the strategy of bidding exactly Tj for this item.
If player 2 bids (y1, . . . , ym) for every item j so that yj ∈ [0, Tj ], then (since player 1
bids positive for any particular item j with probablility 1/m) her expected utility is
1
m
m∑
j=1
Gj(yj)(2V − m∑
k=1
qwk (yk)) + (1−Gj(yj))(V −
m∑
k=1
k 6=j
qwk (yk)− qlj(yj))

=
1
m
m∑
j=1
V +Gj(yj)(V − qwj (yj) + qlj(yj))− m∑
k=1
k 6=j
qwk (yk)− qlj(yj)

=
1
m
m∑
j=1
V + (m− 1)qwj (yj) + qlj(yj)− m∑
k=1
k 6=j
qwk (yk)− qlj(yj)

=
1
m
mV +m m∑
j=1
qwj (yj)−m
m∑
k=1
qwk (yk)
 = V.
Bidding greater than Tj for any item is dominated by the strategy of bidding exactly
Tj for this item. Overall, B is Nash equilibrium.
CLAIM 6.14. Gj(·) and Fj(·) are valid cumulative distributions.
PROOF. It is sufficient to show that for every j, Gj(Tj) = Fj(Tj) = 1 and Gj(x) and
Fj(x) are non-decreasing in [0, Tj ]. In the following we skip index j.
G(T ) =
(m− 1)qw(T ) + ql(T )
V − qw(T ) + ql(T ) =
(m− 1) Vm + ql(T )
V − Vm + ql(T )
= 1,
F (T ) =
v − V/m+ ql(T )
v − qw(T ) + ql(T ) =
v − V/m+ ql(T )
v − V/m+ ql(T ) = 1,
Now let x1 > x2, x1, x2 ∈ [0, Tj ].
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G(x1)−G(x2)
=
(m− 1)qw(x1) + ql(x1)
V − qw(x1) + ql(x1) −
(m− 1)qw(x2) + ql(x2)
V − qw(x2) + ql(x2)
=
V (m− 1)(qw(x1)− qw(x2)) +m(qw(x1)ql(x2)− ql(x1)qw(x2)) + V (ql(x1)− ql(x2))
(V − qw(x1) + ql(x1))(V − qw(x2) + ql(x2))
=
(V (m− 1) +m · ql(x2))(qw(x1)− qw(x2)) +m( Vm − qw(x2))(ql(x1)− ql(x2))
(V − qw(x1) + ql(x1))(V − qw(x2) + ql(x2)) ≥ 0
Fj(x1)− Fj(x2)
=
v − V/m+ ql(x1)
v − qw(x1) + ql(x1) −
v − V/m+ ql(x2)
v − qw(x2) + ql(x2)
=
(v − Vm )(qw(x1)− qw(x2)) + Vm (ql(x1)− ql(x2)) + qw(x1)ql(x2)− ql(x1)qw(x2)
(v − qw(x1) + ql(x1))(v − qw(x2) + ql(x2))
=
(v − Vm + ql(x2))(qw(x1)− qw(x2)) + ( Vm − qw(x2))(ql(x1)− ql(x2))
(v − qw(x1) + ql(x1))(v − qw(x2) + ql(x2)) ≥ 0
For both inequalities we use the monotonicity of q, moreover that qwj (x) ≤ V/m for
x ∈ [0, Tj ], and v = V/
√
m hold.
7. DISCRIMINATORY AUCTIONS
Discriminatory auctions are multi-unit auctions, i.e. m units of the same item are sold
to n bidders. We denote the valuation of player i for j units of the item by vi(j). The
valuation vi is submodular, if the items have decreasing marginal values, that is, vi(s+
1)−vi(s) ≥ vi(t+1)−vi(t) holds if s ≤ t. It is called subadditive, if vi(s+t) ≤ vi(s)+vi(t).
We assume a standard multi-unit auction in which each player submits a vector bi
of m decreasing bids bi(1) ≥ bi(2) ≥ . . . ≥ bi(m) ≥ 0. The bidding profile of all players
is then b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn). In the allocation ξ(b) = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn), bidder i gets ξi units
of the item, if ξi of his bids were among the m highest bids of the players. In the case
of discriminatory pricing, every bidder i pays the sum of his winning bids, i.e. his ξi
highest bids.
In this section, we complement the results by de Keijzer et al. [2013] for the case
of subadditive valuations, by providing a matching lower bound of 2 for the standard
bidding format. For the case of submodular valuations, we provide a lower bound of
1.109. We could reprove their upper bound of e/(e − 1) for submodular bids, using our
non-smooth approach. Due to the different nature of this auction, the proof is not iden-
tical with the one for the first-price auction. Therefore, we present the complete proof
of this upper bound.
7.1. Preliminaries
The social welfare of the allocation ξ(b) is SW (b) = SW (ξ(b)) =
∑n
i=1 vi(ξi). The
players have quasi-linear utility functions:
ui(b) = vi(ξi)−
ξi∑
j=1
bi(j)
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Similarly to item bidding auctions, having a mixed strategy Bi, means that bi is
drawn from the set of all possible decreasing bid vectors according to the distribution
Bi, which we denote by bi ∼ Bi. Given a valuation profile v of the players, an optimal
allocation o(v) = ov = (ov1 , . . .ovn) is one that maximizes
∑n
i=1 vi(o
v
i ).
Consider a discriminatory auction with submodular valuations, with n players and
m items. Recall that vi(j) denotes the valuation of player i for j copies of the item.
For any player i, we define vij = vi(j)j . It is easy to see that for submodular functions,
vij ≥ vi(j+1) for all j ∈ [m− 1]. Let βj(b) be the jth lowest bid among the winning bids
under the strategy profile b. Consider any randomized bidding profile B = (B1, ..., Bn).
For this B, βj(b) is a random variable depending on b ∼ B. We define the following
functions:
Fij(x) = P[βj(b−i) ≤ x] for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
Gij(x) = P[βj(b−i) ≤ x < βj+1(b−i)] = Fij(x)− Fi(j+1)(x) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1.
We define separately Gim(x) = P[βm(b−i) ≤ x] = Fim(x). Notice that Fij(x) is the CDF
of βj(b−i); moreover for the Gij holds that
Fij(x) =
m∑
k=j
Gik(x),
m′∑
j=1
Fij(x) =
m′∑
j=1
jGij(x) +
m∑
j=m′+1
m′Gij(x). (3)
We further define F avi (x) =
1
ovi
∑ovi
j=1 Fij(x), and let β
av
i be a random variable with
F avi (x) as CDF. F avi (x) is a cumulative distribution function defined on R+, since
F avi (0) = 0, limx→+∞(F avi (x)) = 1 and F avi (x) is the average of non-decreasing func-
tions, so it is itself a non-decreasing function. Moreover,
E[βavi ] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F avi (x))dx =
∫ ∞
0
(1− 1
ovi
ovi∑
j=1
Fij(x))dx
=
1
ovi
ovi∑
j=1
∫ ∞
0
(1− Fij(x)) dx = 1
ovi
ovi∑
j=1
βj(B−i),
where βj(B−i) = Eb−i∼B−i [βj(b−i)]. Note that the above functions depend on some
randomized bidding profile B−i and on v. These will be clear from context when we
use these functions below.
7.2. Upper bound for submodular valuations
LEMMA 7.1. For any submodular valuation profile v and any randomized bidding
profile B, there exists a pure bidding strategy ai(v,B−i) for each player i, such that:
n∑
i=1
ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i) ≥
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
vi(o
v
i )−
m∑
j=1
βj(B),
where βj(B) = Eb∼B[βj(b)].
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PROOF. Recall that vij = vi(j)j . Let ai be the value that maximizes (viovi −ai)F avi (ai).
Let ai(v,B−i) = (ai, . . . , ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
ovi
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−ovi
) be the selected strategy profile for player i. Ob-
serve that by the definition of Gij(), Gij(ai) is the probability of ai being the jth lowest
bid among winning bids under B−i. Therefore, if player i bids according to ai(v,B−i),
Gij(ai) is the probability of player i getting exactly j items, if j ≤ ovi , and ovi items, if
j > ovi , under the bidding profile (ai(v,B−i),B−i). Similarly to Lemma 3.2, we get
ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i) ≥
ovi∑
j=1
Gij(ai)(vi(j)− jai) +
m∑
j=ovi +1
Gij(ai)(vi(o
v
i )− ovi ai)
=
ovi∑
j=1
jGij(ai)(vij − ai) +
m∑
j=ovi +1
ovi Gij(ai)(viovi − ai)
≥ (viovi − ai)
 ovi∑
j=1
jGij(ai) +
m∑
j=ovi +1
ovi Gij(ai)

= (viovi − ai)
ovi∑
j=1
Fij(ai) = o
v
i (viovi − ai)F avi (ai)
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
ovi viovi − ovi E [βavi ] =
(
1− 1
e
)
vi(o
v
i )− ovi E [βavi ]
=
(
1− 1
e
)
vi(o
v
i )−
ovi∑
j=1
βj(B−i)
For the second inequality, vij ≥ vioi for submodular valuations and for the following
equality, we used (3) where m′ is set to ovi . For the last inequality we apply Lemma 3.3,
since ai maximizes the expression (viovi − ai)F avi (ai).
For any pure strategy profile b and any valuation profile v it holds that
m∑
j=1
βj(b) ≥
n∑
i=1
ovi∑
j=1
βj(b) ≥
n∑
i=1
ovi∑
j=1
βj(b−i).
By summing up over all players and using this inequality the lemma follows.
THEOREM 7.2. The coarse correlated PoA for the discriminatory auction is at most
e
e−1 , when the players’ valuations are submodular.
PROOF. Suppose B is a coarse correlated equilibrium (in this case v is fixed). By
Lemma 7.1 and the definition of coarse correlated equilibrium, we have that
n∑
i=1
ui(B) ≥
n∑
i=1
ui(ai(v,B−i),B−i)
≥
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
vi(o
v
i )−
m∑
j=1
βj(B)
After rearranging the terms SW (B) =
∑
i ui(B) +
∑
j βj(B) ≥
(
1− 1e
)
SW (o).
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THEOREM 7.3. The BPoA of the discriminatory auction is at most ee−1 , when the
players’ valuations are submodular.
PROOF. Suppose B is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and the valuation of each
player i is vi ∼ Di, where the Di’s are independent distributions. We denote by
C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) the bidding distribution in B which includes the randomness of
both the bidding strategy b and of the valuations v, that is bi(vi) ∼ Ci. Then the utility
of agent i with valuation vi can be expressed by ui(Bi(vi),C−i). It should be noted that
C−i depends on D−i but not on the v−i. For any agent i and any submodular valuation
vi ∈ Vi, consider the following deviation: sample v′−i ∼ D−i and bid ai((vi,v′−i),C−i) as
defined in Lemma 7.1. By the definition of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we have
E
v−i
[uvii (Bi(vi),B−i(v−i))] ≥ E
v′−i
[uvii (ai((vi,v
′
−i),C−i),C−i)]
By taking expectation over vi and summing up over all agents,
n∑
i=1
E
v
[ui(B(v))]
≥
n∑
i=1
E
vi,v′−i
[uvii (ai((vi,v
′
−i),C−i),C−i)]
=E
v
[
n∑
i=1
uvii (ai(v,C−i),C−i)
]
(by relabeling v′−i by v−i)
≥
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
vi(o
v
i )−
m∑
j=1
βj(C)
=
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
vi(o
v
i )−
m∑
j=1
E
v
[βj(B(v))]
So, Ev[SW (B(v))] =
∑
i Ev[ui(B(v))] +
∑
j Ev[βj(B(v))] ≥
(
1− 1e
)
Ev[SW (ov)].
7.3. Lower bounds
7.3.1. Submodular valuations
THEOREM 7.4. The price of anarchy for submodular discriminatory auctions is at
least 1.099.
PROOF. We present an example for a discriminatory auction with submodular val-
uations and show that the PoA of mixed Nash equilibria is at least 1.099.
We design a game with two players and two identical items. Player 1 has valuation
(v, v), i.e., her valuation is v if she gets one or two items; whereas player 2 has valuation
(1, 2), i.e., he is additive with value 1 for each item. We use the following distribution
functions defined by Hassidim et al. [2011]:
G(x) =
x
1− x, x ∈ [0, 1/2]; F (y) =
v − 1/2
v − y , y ∈ [0, 1/2].
Consider the following mixed strategy profile. Player 1 bids (x, 0) and player 2 bids
(y, y), where x and y are drawn from G(x) and F (y), respectively. Noting that player
2 bids 0 with probability F (0) = 1 − 1/2v, we need a tie-breaking rule for the case of
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bidding 0, in which player 2 always gets the item. We claim that this mixed strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium.
First we prove that playing (x, 0) for player 1 is a best response for every x ∈ [0, 1/2].
Notice that (x, x′) with x′ ≤ x, is dominated by (x, 0), since if player 1 gets at least one
item, she should pay at least x and getting both items doesn’t add to her utility.
u1(x, 0) = F (x) · (v − x) = v − 1/2.
Clearly, bidding higher than 1/2 guarantees the item but the payment is higher.
Now we need to show that (y, y) is a best response for player 2, for every y ∈ [0, 1/2].
Consider any strategy (y, y′) with y, y′ ∈ [0, 1/2] and y ≥ y′.
u2(y, y
′) = P[x ≤ y′](2− y − y′) + P[x > y′](1− y)
= G(y′)(2− y − y′) + (1−G(y′))(1− y) = G(y′)(1− y′) + 1− y = 1 + y′ − y ≤ 1,
and u2(y, y) = 1 is maximum possible. Bidding strictly higher than 1/2 for both items
is not profitable, since then her utility is 2− 2y < 1.
Now we calculate the expected social welfare of this Nash equilibrium.
E[SW ] = P[y ≥ x]2 + P[x > y](1 + v)
= 2− (1− v)P[x > y]
= 2− (1− v)
∫ 1/2
0
F (x)dG(x)
This expression is maximized for v = 0.643. For this value of v, E[SW ] = 1.818. Since
SW (O) = 2, we get PoA= 1.099.14
7.3.2. Subadditive valuations. We provide a tight lower bound of 2 for subadditive val-
uations in discriminatory auctions which is similar to the lower bound of Section 4,
adjusted to discriminatory auctions.
THEOREM 7.5. For discriminatory auctions the price of anarchy in mixed Nash
equilibria is at least 2 for bidders with subadditive valuations.
PROOF. Consider two players and m items with the following valuations: player 1
is a unit-demand player with valuation v < 1 if she gets at least one item; player 2
has valuation 1 for getting less than m but at least one items, and 2 if she gets all the
items. Inspired by [Hassidim et al. 2011], we use the following distribution functions:
G(x) =
(m− 1)x
1− x , x ∈ [0, 1/m]; F (y) =
v − 1/m
v − y , y ∈ [0, 1/m].
Player 1 bids b1 = (x, 0, ..., 0) and player 2 bids b2 = (y, ..., y). x and y are drawn from
G(x) and F (y), respectively. In case of a tie, the item is always allocated to player 2.
Let B = (B1, B2) denote this mixed bidding profile. We are going to prove that B is a
mixed Nash equilibrium for every v > 1/m.
If player 1 bids any x in the range (0, 1/m] for one item, she gets the item with
probability F (x), since a tie occurs with zero probability. Her expected utility is
F (x)(v − x) = v − 1/m. So, for every x ∈ (0, 1/m] her utility is v − 1/m. If player 1
14This bound can be improved to 1.109 by a similar construction with 3 items. For large m the bound goes to
one, so we do not believe that this construction is tight. That is the reason why we present here the simplest
version of 2 items.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. X, No. X, Article X, Publication date: October 2015.
Tight Bounds for the PoA of Simultaneous First Price Auctions X:31
picks x according to G(x), her utility is still v − 1/m, since she bids 0 with zero prob-
ability. Bidding something greater than 1/m results in a utility less than v − 1/m.
Regarding player 1, it remains to show that her utility when bidding for only one item
is at least as high as her utility when bidding for more items. Suppose player 1 bids
(x1, ..., xm), where xi ≥ xi+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1. Player 1 doesn’t get any item if and only
if y ≥ x1. So, with probability F (x1), she gets at least one item and she pays at least
x1. Therefore, her expected utility is at most F (x1)(v − x1) = v − 1/m, but it would be
strictly less if she had nonzero payments for other items with positive probability. This
means that bidding only x1 for one item and zero for the rest of them dominates the
strategy (x1, ..., xm).
If player 2 bids y for all items, where y ∈ [0, 1/m], she gets m items with probability
G(y) andm−1 items with probability 1−G(y). Her expected utility isG(y)(2−my)+(1−
G(y))(1− (m− 1)y) = G(y)(1− y) + 1− (m− 1)y = 1. Bidding something greater than
1/m results in utility less than 1. Suppose now that player 2 bids (y1, ..., ym), where
yi ≥ yi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. If x ≤ ym, player 2 gets all the items; otherwise she gets
m− 1 items and she pays her m− 1 highest bids. So, her utility is
G(ym)
(
2−
m∑
i=1
yi
)
+ (1−G(ym))
(
1−
m−1∑
i=1
yi
)
= G(ym)(1− ym) + 1−
m−1∑
i=1
yi
= mym + 1−
m∑
i=1
yi
≤ mym + 1−
m∑
i=1
ym = 1.
Overall, we proved that B is a mixed Nash equilibrium. It is easy to see that the
social welfare in the optimum allocation is 2. In this Nash equilibrium, player 2 bids 0
with probability 1− 1mv , so, with at least this probability, player 1 gets one item.
SW (B) ≤
(
1− 1
mv
)
(v + 1) +
1
mv
2 = 1 + v +
1
mv
− 1
m
If we set v = 1/
√
m, then SW (B) ≤ 1 + 2√
m
− 1m . So, PoA ≥ 21+ 2√
m
− 1m
which, for large
m, converges to 2.
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A. A LOWER BOUND EXAMPLE FOR THE SINGLE ITEM BAYESIAN POA.
Bayesian equilibria were known to be inefficient [Krishna 2002]. Here, for the sake of
completeness, we present a lower bound example for the Bayesian price of anarchy,
with two players and only one item.
THEOREM A.1. For single-item auctions the PoA in Bayesian Nash equilibria is at
least 1.06.
PROOF. In the lower-bound instance we have two bidders and only one item. The
valuation of bidder 1 is always 1. Let l = 1 − 2/e, and r = 1 − 1/e. The valuation of
bidder 2 is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function H :
H =
{
1
e(1−l) =
1
2 , x ∈ [0, l]
1
e(1− x+l2 )
= 2e(1−x)+2 , x ∈ [l, 1].
Observe that v2 = 0 with probability 1/2, and v2 is distributed over [l, 1] otherwise.
Consider the following bidding strategy B = (B1, B2) : B1 has a uniform distribution
on [l, r] with CDF G(x) = x−lr−l = ex − e + 2 on [l, r]; whereas the distribution B2 is
determined by the distribution of v2 :
b2(v2) =
{
0, v2 = 0
v2+l
2 , v2 ∈ [l, 1].
Let F (x) denote the CDF of b2. We can compute the distribution of b2 as follows. For
x ∈ [0, l), we have F (x) = P[b2 ≤ x] = 12 ; for x ∈ [l, r] we have F (x) = P[b2 ≤ x] =
P[v2+l2 ≤ x] = P[v2 ≤ 2x − l] = 1e(1−x) . Finally, F (x) = 1 for x ≥ r. In summary, b2 = 0
with probability 1/2, and is distributed over [l, r] otherwise. On the other hand, b1 is
uniformly distributed over [l, r]. We do not need to bother about tie-breaking, since
there are no mass points in [l, r].
We prove next, that B is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consider first player 2. If
v2 = 0, his utility is clearly maximized. If v2 ∈ [l, 1], then E[u2(b2)] = G(b2)(v2 − b2).
By straightforward calculation we obtain that over [l, r] the function G(x)(v2 − x) =
(x−l)(v2−x)
r−l is maximized in b2 = (v2 + l)/2, so b2(v2) is best response for bidder 2.
Consider now player 1. Given that over [l, r] the distribution of b2 is F (x) = 1e(1−x) ,
every bid b1 ∈ [l, r] is best response for player 1, since his utility F (b1)(1 − b1) = 1/e is
constant. Now we are ready to compute the social welfare of this Nash equilibrium.
SW (B) = Pr[v2 ≤ l] · 1 +
∫ 1
l
(v2 ·G(b2(v2)) + 1−G(b2(v2))) · h(v2)dv2 ≤ 0.942
So the PoA is at least 1.06.
B. ANONYMITY ASSUMPTION
Recall that we assume that qwj (x) (or qlj(x)) is the same for all bidders. Without the
anonymity of qwj (·) over buyers, we can show by the following example that the PoA
is unbounded. Suppose there is a single item to be sold to two players with valuation
v1 = 1 and v2 = . The losing payment is 0 for both players but the winning payments
are different such that qw(x) = x for bidder 1 and q¯w(x) =  · x for bidder 2. If there is a
tie, then the item is allocated to player 2.Now consider the bidding strategy b1 = b2 = 1.
It is easy to see that it forms a Nash Equilibrium and has PoA = 1/.
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